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1. Introduction
In the face of the twin pressing challenges of energy security and climate change, both
developed and developing countries have demonstrated strong interests in energy innovation
and innovation-enhancing policies, particularly with respect to the development of low-carbon
energy technologies. However, a real fact is that the energy sector still faces a surprisingly
low level of innovative activities in both R&D spending (inputs of innovation) and patenting
(outputs of innovation) (Nemet and Kammen, 2007; Margolis and Kammen, 1999a,b;
Henderson and Newell, 2010; Newell, 2011).
With the exception of previous peak spending periods in the late 1970s (due to the Arab
Oil Embargo) and year 2009 stimulus spending (for recovery from economic recessions), the
U.S. public expenditure on energy R&D remains dramatically low over the past four decades
(1973-2013). As compared to other budget categories like national defense, health care, and
space programs (more than 100 billions of U.S. dollars), R&D spending for energy
technologies are dramatically small with a level of less than 10 billion of U.S. dollars
(Henderson and Newell, 2010). Actually, all International Energy Agency (IEA) member
countries experience such a trend of underinvestment in energy R&D. Except for year 2009
one-time “green” stimulus spending, 1 total public budgets for energy R&D in all IEA
countries have declined in real terms over the past 30 years (the pre-stimulus nominal levels
just above the amount budgeted in 1976). The relative share of energy R&D in total R&D
budget has declined significantly from 12% in 1981 to 4% in 2008, and energy R&D
expenditure in IEA countries is about 0.03% of GDP in 2008 (IEA, 2010). Extending to the
global scale, the IEA also argues that a great deal more must be done to bridge the gap
between the U.S.$ 10 billion in annual pre-stimulus spending and the estimated U.S.$ 40 - 90
billion needed to meet future energy supply and environmental needs (IEA, 2010).2 In terms
of patenting, the number of energy-specific patents filed dramatically fall over time as an
outcome of the declining energy R&D spending, which are orders of magnitude smaller than
the total number of granted patents (Margolis and Kammen, 1999a,b; Nemet and Kammen,
2007).

“Green” stimulus budgets are normally one-time increases in funds, and new commitments to
energy R&D may be ending. Whether the sudden push for energy R&D expenditure is sustainable
over the medium to long term is uncertain (IEA, 2010).
1

At the sectoral level, R&D intensity (R&D expenditure as a share of output sales) also shows the
trend of underinvestment in energy technology. Innovation-intensive sectors such as information
technologies (IT) feature a high level of R&D intensity (>10%), while that intensity in energy sector
is less than 1% (Margolis and Kammen, 1999a,b; Neuhoff, 2005; Henderson and Newell, 2010).
2
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In this context, we are motivated to investigate the following important issues: (1) why
there is insufficient incentive of R&D and innovation in energy sectors, (2) which factors
disrupt the effective functioning of energy innovation systems and thus slow the pace of
technological progress, and (3) which innovation policies need to be put in place in order to
accelerate energy innovation. To address these issues, we draw on the paradigm of
“technology push/market pull” as a framework to analyze the economics of energy
innovation. By doing that, we aim to identify the factors that inhibit energy innovation,
understand its effects on techno-economic systems, and motivate policy proposition for
accelerating energy innovations.
Note that, given the urgency and novelty of energy technological innovation issues, it is
not surprisingly that a large body of recent studies have explored the policy issues related to
energy innovation (e.g., Noberg-Bohm, 2000; Grubb, 2004; Gallagher et al., 2006; Sagar and
van der Zwaan, 2006; Nemet and Kammen, 2007; Newell 2008; Anadon and Holdren 2009;
Weiss and Bonvillian 2009; Narayanamurti et al., 2009; Henderson and Newell, 2010; Newell,
2010, 2011; Anadon, 2010; Grübler et al. 2012). In general, these works have the virtue of
providing helpful policy prescriptions and are characterized as an important starting point
for further studies. That said, the frustrating limitation of the existing works is that, due to the
normative nature of policy analysis, they lack a rigorous exposition of the basic positive
issues concerning the economic mechanisms of energy innovation. Such a positive economic
analysis is particularly needed on the ground that without having a good understanding of
the basic positive issues (what’s the underlying mechanism involved in energy innovation), it
will become challenging to serve the purpose of normative policy analysis (which policies
should be made to accelerate energy innovation). Therefore, to fill the gap in current literature,
this paper contributes to a useful complement by providing a positive investigation of the
economic mechanism specific to energy technological innovation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly introduces the “technology
push v.s. market pull” framework. We begin our economic analysis in Section 3 by clarifying
the market size effect and its impact on energy technological innovation. We continue in
Section 4 by investigating the effect of market structure on innovation incentives. Based on
the positive economic analysis, Section 5 presents some policy recommendations that
potentially help accelerate energy technological innovation. Section 6 concludes.

2. Technology Push and Market Pull
The methodological framework used in our analysis is building on the idea of “technology
3
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push/market pull”.3 We claim that innovation is a dynamic, evolving process involved with
sequential and interconnected multiple stages, not a single piecemeal event centering on R&D.
Innovation is more than R&D investment, and a focus on R&D is important, but only touches
on a small part of the broader innovation process. In general, an innovation process involves
the following stages.
1) Basic R&D: research is undertaken by university researchers, government and industrial
laboratories to create general-purpose technological and scientific knowledge with
potential applications in a wide range of areas;
2) Applied R&D: entrepreneurs adapt the general-purpose knowledge into market-oriented
technologies for exploiting business opportunities;
3) Demonstration: technical and cost performances of the technologies are demonstrated to
potential investors to identify the market potential;
4) Deployment: specific products embodying the technologies are produced for small-scale
deployments in the marketplace;
5) Market accumulation: the new product accumulates its market shares as the consumers’
acceptance grows;
6) Large-scale diffusion: with technical performance improved by the learning-by-doing and
economies of scale, new technology penetrates in the market for large-scale diffusions.
Clearly, different innovation stages are interconnected in the innovation process, and it
combines the elements of “technology push” (forces stimulating knowledge generation) and
“market pull” (forces inducing market demands for innovation), leading to the “technology
push v.s. market pull” paradigm.4 This then raise a major issue for the analysis of innovation:
whether innovation is mainly determined by scientific knowledge constraints in particular
technology fields (technology push), or whether it is primarily stimulated by profit
motivations (market pull). Scientists and economists typically give different answers.
Scientific accounts of innovation come down on a science-driven view. The core of this
argument is that innovation depends on the autonomous progress of scientific understanding
and knowledge in R&D stages, and scientific knowledge constraints play an important role in
shaping the evolutionary paths in particular fields of technologies.5

For an articulation of the “technology push/market pull” paradigm, see von Hippel (1976),
Gibbons and Johnston (1974), Mowery and Rosenberg (1979), Walsh (1984), Freeman (1994),
Freeman and Soete (1997), Nemet (2009).
3

In general, Stages (1)-(3) in the innovation process are thought of as the driver of “technology
push”, and Stages (4)-(6) as the force of “market full”.
4

Taking energy innovation as an example, while researchers embarked on R&D in photovoltaics
(PV) and IT technologies at almost the same time in the 1950s, PV technology development
5
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To be relevant to the economic analysis, we believe that market demand and profitability
drives innovations, and changes in market conditions create opportunities for firms to invest
in innovation to satisfy the unmet demand.6 If technological innovation is primarily spurred
by profitability in the marketplaces, then the characteristics of market conditions, especially
market size and market structure, will have important implications for innovation and hence
deserve particular examination. This logic thus motivates us to focus on the market-pulling
side and adopt a market-driven view to examine the mechanism of energy innovation, where
innovation is treated as an economic activity and responds to profit incentives.7
Moreover, within our economic framework, we emphasize that innovation is an outcome
of interactions among different economic actors, operating within specific market conditions.
Considerations should thus be given to the economic system in which innovation occurs,
involving different actors (incumbents or entrepreneurs), different patterns of behaviors
(R&D or conventional production), different market structures (monopolistic or competitive),
and different policy incentives (feed-in tariff or quantitative portfolio). Such a framework can
help offer deeper insights into the causes that slow energy technological innovation.8
To articulate the market-driven aspect of innovation, the following sections will examine
two determinants of innovation: market size (Sections 3), and market structure (Sections 4).
proceeds differently compared to IT, with the latter experiencing a much faster pace of technology
progress. From a science-driven (technology push) perspective, this divergence pattern is due in
substantial part to different scientific fundamentals that constrain knowledge breakthroughs in the
basic R&D phase. While the seemingly limitless potentials of quantum effects help IT technologies
sustain the pace of the well-known Moore’s Law (the number of transistor embodied in a chip
doubles every two years), the law of nature (the Carnot thermodynamic efficiency limit) imposes
an impenetrable ceiling on energy conversion efficiency improvement, keeping PV technologies
from following a path similar to IT technologies
This market-driven view that profit opportunities are the primary determinant of innovation is
articulated in the seminal work of Schmookler (1962, 1966), arguing that innovation is largely an
economic activity which, like other economic activities, is pursued for profit gains. The studies by
Griliches (1957), and Griliches and Schmookler (1963) also provide empirical supports for the
market-driven perspective that technological innovation are closely linked to the profitability in
commercial markets. Similar conclusions are also reached in more recent studies, especially in the
induced innovation literature (e.g., Lichtenberg, 1986; Jaffe and Palmer, 1997; Newell et al., 1999;
Goulder and Schneider, 1999; Grubb et al., 2002; Popp, 2002; Acemoglu, 2002; Sue Wing, 2003;
Popp et al., 2009).
6

That said, our arguments do not mean a dichotomy between the “technology push” and “market
pull”. Rather, we agree that transformative technological change requires the simultaneous
leveraging and coupling of both “technology supply push” and “market demand pull” as
suggested by Nelson and Winter (1977), Mowery and Rosenberg (1979), Kleinknecht and
Verspagen (1990), Arthur (2007); Dosi, 1982, Klevorick et al., 1995.
7

The importance of potential economic feedbacks and interactions in the innovation system has
been acknowledged in a large number of studies (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1977; Nelson, 1993;
Rosenberg, 1994; Geels, 2004; Dosi, 1982; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Freeman 1994; Lundvall, 1992;
Klevorick et al., 1995; Hekkert et al., 2007; Bergek et al., 2008; Gallagher et al., 2006, 2012).
8
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Our analysis is undertaken in a way of comparing energy technology (slow innovation) with
IT technology (fast innovation). Such a comparative approach may help clarify the differences
between energy and IT innovation, and improve our understanding of the causes that slow
energy innovation.

3. Market Size Effect
Drawing on the insights from the endogenous growth theory (Romer, 1986, 1990; Rivera-Batiz
and Romer, 1991), this section aims to demonstrate that a particular technology that enables
to mobilize the market size effect is more likely to create profitability and thus the incentive of
innovation. To explain this point, we consider a particular industrial sector with individual
firms. For simplicity, we suppose that all firms have access to the same production function
for the final good (the representative firm assumption). Thus, the representative (or aggregate)
production function in this particular sector is written as:

Y = F(K , L, A)

(1)

where Y is the total amount of production of the final good, K is the capital stock, L is
total labor input, and A is technology. The capital stock K corresponds to the inputs of
non-durable physical assets like hardware, machines, and equipments. We can also think of

A as a broad notion of technology (knowledge, ideas, and blueprints) concerning how to
produce goods. A major assumption adopted throughout this section is that technology is a
nonrival (its use by one producer does not preclude its use by others) and nonexcludable (it is
impossible to prevent another person from using it) good. The implication of this assumption
is that technology A is freely available to all potential firms in this particular sector and firms
do not have to pay for making use of this technology.
We assume that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale in capital and
labor (standard rival inputs). More specifically:

F( λK , λL, A)  λ  F(K , L, A) ,

(2)

for all λ > 1 . Intuitively, when capital and labor double, the firm can open a replica of the
same production facility that doubles the outputs of final goods. Naturally, endogenizing A
leads to increasing returns to scale to all three inputs K , L , and A , because knowledge A
(as a nonrival input) is freely accessible to new facility, and new production facility does not
need to replicate A. More specifically, the property of increasing returns can be expressed as:

6
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F( λK , λL, λA)  F( λK , λL, A)  λ  F(K , L, A) ,

(3)

for all λ > 1 , where the first inequity holds for the reason that more outputs will be made by
using an advanced technology λ ×A , with the same amount of capital and labor inputs. The
second equity comes from the constant returns to scale in K and L . Clearly, the condition
F( λK , λL, λA)  λ  F(K , L, A) implies the increasing returns to scale in K , L , and A . That is,

when the inputs of capital, labor, and technology double, the new production facility will
more than double outputs. This property thus implies that in a competitive market the firms
can make positive profits from using more non-rival inputs of knowledge.
Intuitively, since the non-rival knowledge can be used as many units as desired without
incurring further costs, a larger size of market will induce firms to use more of the non-rival
knowledge for pursing increasing returns and profitability – the so-called market size effect.
In contrast, there is no market size effect for the standard rival inputs like labor and capital.
That is, a larger size of market does not necessarily induce firms to use them more intensively,
because more outputs produced (for serving a larger market) means that more of the rival
inputs have to be used and incur more costs. There is thus no profit gain from using more
standard rival inputs (as suggested by the property of constant return to scale).
We now use the market size effect to explain the slow pace of energy innovation. It is
notable that energy technologies are capital-intensive with a large part of rival “hardware”.

9

Putting it into the production function F(K , L , A) , we find that with knowledge as a minor
input A » 0 , Eq. (3) become F( λK , λL, λA)  F( λK , λL, A)  λ  F(K , L, A) ( λ  A  A given

A » 0 ). This implies that production technology in energy sectors is more likely to exhibit a
constant return to scale and thus zero profit gain from making use of energy technology in a
larger market. As a result, energy technology with higher inputs of rival capital is less likely
to take advantage of the market size effect, slowing the innovation and diffusion speed of
new energy technology in the marketplace.
In contrast, IT technologies are often characterized by lower capital intensity and higher
knowledge intensity in terms of using innovative ideas and knowledge as major parts. This
trend becomes more evident as applications of new-generation IT products are increasingly
intertwined with software, internet, and digital services that de facto are free of capital - the
This is especially the case for centralized power generation systems that intensively use “heavy”
capital assets such as hardware, equipments, and machines. As compared to other equipments or
consumer products, energy technology investments are often characterized by high upfront costs,
a high degree of infrastructure, and long payback periods. The capital intensiveness tends to slow
capital turnover and the diffusion speed of new energy technologies (Holdren and Sagar, 2002;
Grubb, 2004; Worrell and Biermans, 2005; Grübler et al., 1999, 2012).
9
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so-called asset-light mode of innovation. With a larger contribution of knowledge A  0 ,
production function will become F( λK , λL, λA)  F( λK , λL, A)  λ  F(K , L, A) ( λA > A given
A  0 ). This implies that production technology in IT sectors exhibits a substantial degree of

increasing returns to scale and thus positive profit gains from using IT technology in new
marketplaces. Accordingly, the knowledge-intensive IT technology is more likely to mobilize
the market size effect for accelerating technology innovation and diffusion.

4. Market Structure Effect
4.1 Supply-side structure
We next turn to investigating the effect on innovation of market structure in both the supply
(Section 4.1) and the demand sides (Section 4.2). Before discussing the differences between
energy and IT market structures, we need to distinguish the characteristics of products. In
general, products produced by different energy technologies feature a substantial degree of
homogeneity. Energy products, often as a homogenous commodity input into intermediate
and final use, have less differentiation in terms of variety, attribute, and function. By contrast,
IT products are characterized by a substantial degree of heterogeneity in varieties, and there
is the differential function and utility from consuming differentiated IT product varieties.
Accordingly, energy innovation features a pattern of “process innovation”: innovation
that reduces the costs of producing existing products. Introduction of new power generation
technology that produces electricity (existing products) at a lower cost is such an example. In
this context, energy innovations typically incur direct price competitions and replacements
between technology incumbents and innovators (with different costs of producing the same
homogenous energy goods).10 The competitive nature of innovation thus implies that there is
an inherent conflict of interests between incumbents and innovators, and the incumbents will
become a natural constituency in favor of certain types of distortionary policies that limit
market entry and shape a monopolistic market structure in energy industries.11

In contrast, IT innovations are characterized by a pattern of “product innovation”: innovations
create products with differentiated function, attributes, and utility. For instance, microprocessors
lead to various distinct hardware devices and contribute to the internet and innumerable digital
applications and services. Clearly, a newly created IT variety with distinct functions can mostly be
used (coexist) alongside existing varieties.
10

Here we adopt the term of “monopolistic market structures” to represent all kinds of imperfect
market structures. In fact, the oligopolistic market structures that often emerge in the energy
industries can also lead to a formulation of monopolistic market structures through either explicit
or tacit collusion.
11

8
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To explain it, we suppose that the current incumbent energy firm has a leading-edge
technology that produces energy at the marginal cost (MC). A perpetual patent system exists
to protect firms with a leading-edge technology (that produces at the lowest MC). Thus, the
(net present discounted) value of this incumbent firm owning the leading-edge technology at
time t is represented as:

V (c , t )   exp    r(s , )  ds ,   π (c , s)  ds
t
 t



s

(4)

s.t. π (c , t )  p(c , t )  x(c , t )  c(t )  x(c , t )
where π (c , t ) denotes the current flow profits of the incumbent firm that produces energy at
the lowest MC c at time t . p(c , t ) and x(c , t ) are endogenous price and quantity choices
of the incumbent firms for maximizing intertemporal profit. Eq. (4) assumes that at each time
point t, only the leading-edge technology (that produces energy at the lowest MC) is adopted
in production. This treatment thus reflects the competitive nature of innovation in the energy
domain: when an energy technology with a lower MC of production is created, it will replace
the incumbent energy technology.12
We proceed by rewriting the value function V (c , t ) in a Hamiltion-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
form given by:

π(c , t )  V(c , t )  r(t ) V(c , t )  z(c , t ) V(c , t )  0

(5)

where the first term represents the gain of current profit flow. The second term comes from
the fact that the maximized value can vary over time. The third and fourth terms correspond
to the losses of value due to losses of interest rates and monopolistic profits, respectively. The
last term reflects the competitive essence of innovation: the existing incumbent will lose its
monopoly position and be replaced by new innovators (who have technologies that produce
at a lower cost) – the so-called Schumpeterian creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1934; 1942).
Accordingly, z(c , t ) represents the rate at which innovation occurs at time t (the rate at
which the technology incumbent is replaced by new entrants). Consider in a balanced growth
path (BGP) equilibrium, where interest rate, flow profit, and the rate of innovation are all
constant over time, r(t ) = r *, π(c , t ) = π *, z(c , t) = z * , for all t . A BGP also implies a constant
maximized value V (c , t )  0 , then from Eq.(5), we derive:
This assumption holds on the ground that energy technologies producing the homogenous
energy goods with different MC of production are largely perfect substitutes, and only the
leading-edge technology having the lowest MC of production is adopted in equilibrium.
12

9
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r * V * 0  π * z* V *



V* 

π*
r *  z*

(6)

where in a BGP equilibrium the value possessed by technology incumbents V * depends on
an effective discount rate r * + z* . To maximize the value V * , technology incumbents tend
to lower the rate of innovation z* by erecting entry barriers. With the entry barriers raising
start-up costs, the incentives of new entrants to innovate will be discouraged, leading to
innovation and replacement at a slower rate.
Intuitively, due to the homogeneity of energy goods, energy innovation often comes with
direct price completion and conflicts of interest, in the sense that innovators will replace the
monopoly positions enjoyed by current incumbents. This raises the possibility that market
regulations limiting new entrants may arise as a way of protecting the monopolistic profits of
politically powerful incumbents.13 A monopolistic structure is thus likely to emerge in energy
markets, which is different from the competitive market structure in IT industries where
innovators have free entry into the deregulated markets.
As a consequence, private firms in the regulated energy markets have lower incentive to
innovate as compared to those in the deregulated IT markets. To explain this point, image
that in the deregulated IT market, there is a large number N of competitive firms with access
to the existing technology that produces one unit of final product at the MC ψ > 0 . Suppose
that one of these firms has access to R&D for advancing technology, if this firm incurs a cost

μ > 0 on R&D spending, it can innovate and reduce the MC to ψ λ , where λ > 1 .
In an equilibrium without R&D and innovation, this firm will charge a price that is equal
to MC, PIN = ψ , where the superscript “N” is the no-innovation case, and the subscript “I”
denotes the IT market. The resulting profit gains of this firm will be:

π IN  ( PIN  ψ)  QIN  0

(7)

where QIN denotes the amount of products supplied by this firm in the IT market.
Consider that if this firm carries out innovation and creates a new production technology,
it will obtain a fully enforced patent to protect the innovation excludability and thus possess
Fossil energy technology incumbents are often politically powerful, in the sense that traditional
fossil fuel technologies have already found multiple applications across many sectors, industries,
and end-users. Such strong dependence creates a self-reinforcing mechanism that makes it
difficult to dislodge the dominant technological regime, leading to “technology lock-in” of fossil
energy technologies (Frankel, 1955; Arthur, 1989; Cowan, 1990; Cowan and Hulten, 1996; Unruh,
2000; Watson, 2004). As a result, new energy technologies, even when economically feasible, still
face higher market entry costs compared to established technologies.
13

10
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ex post monopoly power. The monopoly position enables this innovating firm to earn profits
from innovation, and thus encourage R&D spending in the first place. In this context, the firm
considered will have an incentive to innovate and become an ex post monopolist that chooses
its price to maximize profits as:

π II  D( PII )  ( PII  λ1  ψ)  μ

(8)

where the superscript “I” denotes an innovation case. If this innovating firm spends μ > 0
on R&D, it will innovate and reduce its MC of production to λ- 1 ×ψ . To maximize monopoly
profits, this innovating firm will set a monopoly pricing rule as:

PII 

λ1  ψ
1  εD1

(9)

where the profit-maximizing monopoly pricing rule is set as the constant markups over the
MC. εD denotes the elasticity of market demand. The innovating firm chooses the monopoly
price PII , and captures an market D( PII ) .14 It can be verified that the profits made by this
innovating firm can be strictly positive, π II  D( PII )  ( PII  λ1  ψ)  μ  0 , implying that
innovation is potentially profitable with an ex post monopoly.
As compared to zero profit π IN = 0 in the equilibrium without innovation, the firm in
question has an incentive to innovate for pursing positive profit gains π II > 0 . This situation
corresponds to the deregulated IT market where we start with perfect competitions among a
large number of competitive firms, but one of these firms innovates to escape competition
and gains ex post monopolistic profits, Δπ II = π II - π IN = π II > 0 , which represents the value
of innovation to a firm in the competitive IT market.
Let’s turn to the energy market with entry controls. The same environment is assumed
as in IT markets, but the exception is that in the energy market there is already a monopolist
incumbent that has the existing technology to produce energy at MC = ψ . With an existing
monopoly position, this incumbent firm will choose its monopoly price as:

PEN =

ψ
1 - εD- 1

(10)

To set this unconstrained monopolistic pricing, we implicitly assume that the innovation is
drastic, λ  1 (1  εD1 ) , so that the monopolistic price charged by this innovator is below the price
charged by other firms in the market, PII  ψ .
14

11
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where the superscript “N” corresponds to the non-innovation case, and the subscript “E” to
the energy market. With the profit-maximizing pricing rule, Eq. (10), the energy incumbent
enjoys an existing monopolistic profit, π EN  D( PEN )  ( PEN  ψ) . Now suppose that the energy
incumbent undertakes an innovation by reducing its MC of production from ψ to λ1  ψ ,
it still remains a monopolist and charges a monopoly price as:

λ1  ψ
P 
1  εD1
I
E

(11)

where the superscript “I” denotes the innovation case. As innovation reduces the MC to

λ1  ψ , this energy incumbent make profits, π EI  D( PEI )  ( PEI  λ1  ψ)  μ . Thus, the value of
innovation to this monopolistic energy incumbent is equal to the additional profit gains from
innovation: Δπ EI  π EI  π EN  D( PEI )  ( PEI  λ1  ψ)  μ  D( PEN )  ( PEN  ψ) .
It is verified that Δπ EI  Δπ II , that is, the value of innovation to a monopolist incumbent
firm in the energy market is less than that to a competitive firm in the IT market. As a result,
the monopolist incumbent in the energy sector has a lower incentive to innovate than do the
competitive firms in the IT sector.15 This result provides the following economic intuitions: in
the regulated energy market, innovation often reduces the monopoly profits of the
technology incumbent in making use of its existing profit-making technologies, energy
incumbents thus have lower incentive to innovate and replace their own existing technologies.
In contrast, firms in the competitive IT market have zero ex ante profit to replace, and thus
have stronger innovation incentive to escape competition for positive ex post profits gains.16

4.2 Demand-side structure
In this section, we turn to the demand-side market structure and its effect on innovation. The

This result explains the fact that existing companies in energy-related industries – those that
produce energy, those that manufacture the equipment to produce, convert, and use energy, and
those that distribute energy – either will not engage in as much R&D as would be socially optimal,
or will engage in R&D but delay the introduction of new technologies (Weyant, 2011).
15

This result echoes Arrow’s Replacement Effect: technology incumbents who currently enjoy
monopolistic profits have low incentive to innovate and replace their own profit-making
technologies. The new entrants, once the monopolistic market is deregulated, would have stronger
incentives to innovate (Arrow, 1962a,b). The intuition that a competitive market structure that
allows new entrants play a critical role in spurring innovation goes back to Arrow (1962a,b) and
has been confirmed by important studies (e.g., Mansfield, 1963; Scherer, 1965; Markham, 1965;
Comanor, 1967; Shrieves, 1978; Loury, 1979; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Cohen and Levin, 1989;
Sutton, 1996; Aghion et al., 2005, 2007).
16
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history of past energy transitions highlights the importance of consumers and their demands
in pulling new technologies into widespread market diffusion. Having a good understanding
of the consumer preferences and behaviors thus holds important implications for identifying
the factors that slow energy technology innovation.
Building on the workhorse model of Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic completion (Dixit and
Stiglitz, 1977), we consider an economy admitting a representative consumer with preferences
for two types of goods:

U = u(C , y )

(12)

where C is a composite index of the consumption of a particular product (e.g., energy or IT
product), and y denotes consumptions of the numeraire good. The quantity index, C , is a
subutility function defined over N differentiated varieties c1 ,...,cN of that particular
product, and C is defined by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function as:
ε

 N ε 1  ε 1
C    ci ε 
 i 1


(13)

where c i denotes the consumption of each variety of that particular product, and N is the
range of available product varieties. In this specification, the parameter ε is the elasticity of
substitution between any two differentiated varieties, and we assume that ε > 1 .
The composite index of the consumption bundle C is often referred to as a “Dixit-Stiglitz
preference”, which is characterized by a love-for-variety effect. To see this feature, we consider
the case in which the consumer chooses a total of C units of this particular product,
distributed equally across the N differentiated varieties: c1    cN  C / N . Substituting it
into the utility function in Eq. (12), we obtain:
ε


ε 1 ε 1
1



ε
U  u   N  (C / N )  , y   u( N ε 1  C , y )

(14)

which is strictly increasing in the variety N given the elasticity of substitution, ε > 1 . This
implies that for consumptions of a fixed total C amount of a particular product, the larger is
the number of differentiated varieties of that particular good, the higher is the utility gained
from consuming that product. This reflects the essence of the love-for-variety preferences.
To analyze the effects of consumer’s love-for-variety preferences on innovation, we solve
the consumer problem of maximizing the utility Eq. (12) subject to the budget constraint as:

13
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N

 p c
i

i

ym

(15)

i 1

where the price of product variety c i is denoted by pi and the total income by m. The
price of the numeraire good y is normalized to unity.
The problem can be solved in two steps. First, whatever the value of the consumption
bundle, C , each variety c i is chosen so as to minimize the cost of attaining C . This means
solving the expenditure minimization problem as:

min

c1 ,...,c N

ε

N

 p c
i

i

 N ε 1  ε 1
C    ci ε 
 i 1


s.t.

i 1

(16)

Solving this problem gives the isoelastic demand function for each individual variety c i of
this particular product as:
ε

 pi 
ci     C
Ρ

(17)
1

where

 N
 1 ε
P    pi 1 ε 
 i 1


(18)

denotes the ideal price index, which measures the minimum cost of purchasing a unit of the
composite index C of that particular goods. As Eq. (17) shows, market demands for each
product variety declines as its price rises. This implies that the firm producing each product
variety faces a downward-sloping demand curve and has some degree of monopolistic power
(the feature of Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistically competitive market structure).
In the second step of solving the consumer’s problem, the consumption choice between

C and y is determined by maximizing the utility function Eq. (12) subject to the budge
constraint:

max
C ,y

u(C , y )

P C  y  m

s.t.

(19)

where the budge constraint, Eq. (19), is equivalent to Eq. (15), both representing expenditure
on consuming the particular product C . The F.O.C. to this problem gives equality of
marginal rates of substitutions to the price ratios between C and y :

u(C , y ) / y u((m  y ) / P , y ) / y 1


u(C , y ) / C u((m  y ) / P , y ) / C P

(20)

14
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where the joint concavity of u(C , y ) and the budge constraint P  C  y  m implies that this
FOC can be rewritten as:

y  g( P , m)

C

m  g( P , m)
P

(21)

for some explicit function g(.,.) that is increasing in its first argument P .
Next we turn to the production side of the economy. Suppose that each product variety is
produced and supplied by a particular firm facing a constant MC of production that is equal
to ψ , we thus specify the profit maximization problem of this monopolistic firm as:

 pi  ε 
max ci  ( pi  ψ)  max    C   ( pi  ψ)
pi
pi
 P 


(22)

where the objective of this firm is to choose the monopoly price pi for profit maximization.
Solving this problem derives the profit-maximizing pricing in the form of a constant markup
over the MC of production:

pi  p 

ε
ψ
ε1

(23)

for each product variety i = 1, 2 ,..,N . Since each firm i producing variety c i charges the
same monopolistic price, the ideal price index P can be rewritten as:
1

P  ( N  p 1 ε ) 1 ε  N



1
ε 1

p  N



1
ε 1



ε
ψ
ε1

(24)

given the price charged by each firm, Eq. (23), the isoelastic demand function, Eq. (17), gives
the quantity of product variety c i supplied by this firm as:
ε

ε


 pi 
ci     C  N ε 1  C
P

(25)

hence the profits made by each monopolistic firm i = 1, 2 ,..,N are given by:

π i  ci  ( pi  ψ)  N



ε
ε 1

C 

1
ψ
ε1

(26)

Now we substitute for P from Eq. (24) into Eq. (21) and Eq. (26), and capture the effects
of consumer’s love-for-variety preferences on innovation by firms as:

C

1
 1

m  g( P , m)
ε1 
ε
 N ε 1 
 m  g  N ε 1 
 ψ, m 
P
εψ 
ε1



(27)
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and

πi 

 1

1 
ε
 m  g  N ε 1 
 ψ,m  
εN 
ε1



(28)

It can be verified that depending on the function of g(.) , consumer’s aggregate consumption

C and firms’ profits π are increasing in the number of differentiated product varieties N .
A greater number of available varieties typically reduce profits made by the firm producing
each product variety, the love-for-variety effect embedded in the Dixit-Stiglitz preference,
however, creates a countervailing effect that potentially increases market demand and profits.
Intuitively, the love-for-variety effect serves as a positive pecuniary externality, in the sense
that introduction of a new variety has a positive effect to raise the demand for other varieties.
As a result, a larger number of varieties N raise the utility from consuming that particular
product and boost output sales and profits gains in producing that particular product.
This result thus helps explain a key reason for the slow pace of energy innovation. Since
the homogenous energy products have a small number of differentiated varieties, the positive
pecuniary externality is thus weaker, leading to lower market demands for energy products.17
The lower demands then shrink the output sales and corporate profits of energy firms, giving
rise to a lower level of financial resources for energy R&D and innovation. In contrast, the IT
products with a large number of differentiated varieties tend to mobilize the love-for-variety
effect and positive pecuniary externality. Accordingly, market demands for IT products will
be stronger, creating more profit gains to support R&D for developing new product varieties.

5. Policy Implications
So far the above economic analysis has captured the factors inhibiting energy innovation. This
section addresses public policy implications of these findings for accelerating energy
innovation. An important implication is that sole reliance on traditional innovation policies
centering on R&D expenditure (technology-push) proves to be ineffective. Policymaking
should target at market-pulling measures that guide and regulate energy supply and demand
markets, so that the goal of major technological transformation for a sustainable energy future
can be achieved. We thus propose “3D” principles to guide the designs of energy innovation
policies as follows.

A clear evidence is that customers care more about differentiated product attributes and utilities
than the costs of using the homogenous energy inputs. In most cases, households choose personal
vehicles, electrical appliances for reasons that have little to do with energy use.
17
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5.1 Downsizing the “heavy” assets of energy technologies
As argued in Section 3 concerning the market size effect, traditional fossil fuel-burning
technologies are mostly capital-intensive in making use of “heavy” assets. The rival nature of
these “heavy” physical assets makes energy technologies less likely to mobilize the market
size effect, thus leading to a lower pace of technology innovation and diffusion in the market.
To overcome this problem inherent in traditional centralized power generation systems,
policymaking should aim to downsize the “heavy” assets of existing technology portfolios by
integrating more knowledge-intensive, small-scale decentralized “light” technology assets.
The thin-film cell technology is a good example that should figure prominently in energy
technology portfolios. This new type of PV technology is tailored through micro-structural
and nano-structural engineering, and is characterized by lightweight materials and structures.
By taking advantage of the market size effect, the thin-film cells are expected to gain growing
market shares and achieve large-scale deployments in the decentralized household networks.

5.2 Deregulating the monopolistic energy-supplying markets
As articulated in Section 4.1 (supply-side market structure), new energy technology often
faces potential conflicts of interest with existing incumbents (due to the replacement effect).
This raises the possibility that market regulations for limiting innovators may arise as a way
of protecting the monopolistic rents of current technology incumbents. The monopolist thus
has lower incentives to innovate than does the firms in a competitive industry.
Therefore, to stimulate innovation incentives in energy industries, policymakers should
take measures to create an "innovator-friendly" competitive energy market through structural
reform. Antitrust and deregulation are particularly needed to support the entry of new firms.
As new entrants have stronger incentives to innovate, transforming the monopolistic energy
market structures into an efficient, competitive organizational form is a key step to boosting
competition and innovation in the energy sectors. Consider the worldwide PV industry, this
flourishing field of new energy technology is largely due to its competitive market structure
that features intense inter-firm competitions, where vigorous competitions play a crucial role
in substantial improvements of the technical performance of this new technology.

5.3 Differentiating the homogenous energy products
As proposed in Section 4.2 (demand-side market structure), energy technology is less
likely to take advantage of the love-for-variety effect and positive pecuniary externality due to
17
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a lower level of varieties differentiation. As a result, consumer demands for energy products
are lower, shrinking corporate profits available to fund energy technology R&D.
It is worth noting that the substantial homogeneity of energy products is largely due to
the “no intervention” market conditions that fail to internalize the non-market environmental
externality. Without corrections for the environmental cost of “dirty” energy technologies and
the environmental benefit of “clean” ones, both types of technologies largely serve as perfect
substitutes. Put differently, with the same market-based benefits (homogenous energy goods),
the huge cost gap between “clean” technologies (high production cost) and traditional “dirty”
ones (low production cost) necessitates a direct substitution and replacement of the latter for
the former.
In this context, to catalyze the love-for-variety effect and positive pecuniary externality,
one of policy priorities is to differentiate energy product varieties by distinguishing fossil
fuel-burning energy technologies with environmental-friendly ones in terms of their different
environmental costs and benefits. Hence, two policy schemes should be explicitly considered.
One is non-economic instruments. For instance, government should launch specific education
programs to promote the environmental awareness of individuals, so that their utilities will
spontaneously value environmental attributes embedded in clean energy technologies. With
the environmental quality valued by consumer preferences, clean energy technology is more
likely to become a distinct variety (an imperfect substitute) from traditional fossil one, thus
catalyzing the love-for-variety effect and positive pecuniary externality to accelerate energy
technological innovation.
The other policy scheme includes the economic instruments that convert the non-market
immeasurable environmental benefits into measurable market-based values. For example, the
non-market environmental values possessed by clean energy technologies can be materialized
by creating a market for environmental goods. In this regard, carbon markets should thus be
established to provide expectations on the distinct values of carbon savings and incentives to
create clean technologies. While carbon markets play a pivotal role in fostering long-term
energy innovation, it is still necessary to implement complementary policy to stabilize and
underpin the price of carbon in the short term,18 which includes both price and quantity
instruments. For the former, considerations should be given to fiscal incentives such as
feed-in tariffs, tax credits or subsidies for renewable energy, and carbon tax on fossil fuels.19
The reason is that current carbon markets (e.g., EU emissions trading schemes) are too uncertain
and unpredictable in the short run, thus failing to materialize the real values of environmental
goods and attract the scale of demand and investment needed in clean energy technologies.
18

Consider PV cell technology, although government-sponsored R&D has been a major stimulus
to innovation, fiscal incentives (subsidizing PV, taxing fossil fuels) have figured prominently in
19
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The quantity tools include renewable quantitative portfolio standards mandated by the
government.20

6. Conclusions
Energy technological innovation and innovation-enhancing policies have drawn substantial
attentions as a way of addressing the twin challenges of energy security and climate change.
However, the fact is that the energy sector still faces a surprisingly low level of innovation.
This paper adopts a positive economic framework to explore the mechanism of energy
innovation and capture the main causes that slow energy innovation.
We find that energy technology that intensively uses rival input of capital often exhibits
constant returns to scale and zero profit gain in making use of energy technology in a larger
market. As a result, energy technology often finds it difficult to take advantage of the market
size effect, thus slowing the innovation and diffusion of energy technology in the market.
Our findings also suggest that the homogeneous nature of energy goods will bring about
market structure effects. On the one hand, in energy supply side the homogeneity potentially
incurs competition between technology incumbents and innovators. This raises the possibility
that a monopolistic market structure limiting new entrants may arise as a way of protecting
the monopolistic rents of incumbents. Energy incumbents enjoying their own profit-making
technologies thus have lower incentives to innovate than do new entrants in a competitive
energy market. On the other hand, on the energy demand side the homogeneity implies that
energy technology is less likely to catalyze the consumers’ love-for-variety effect and positive
pecuniary externality. This leads to lower market demands for energy products and corporate
profits of energy firms, which shrinks the financial resources for energy R&D and innovation.
Based on the understanding of the market size and market structure effects, we propose
the following three overarching policy principles: (1) downsizing the “heavy” assets of
capital-intensive technology portfolios by integrating knowledge-intensive, small-scale
decentralized “light” technology assets; (2) deregulating the monopolistic energy-supplying
markets by promoting vigorous competition and the entry of new firms; and (3)
recent policy portfolios. With the environmental benefits internalized by price instruments, PV cell
becomes preferable to traditional fossil fuel-based technologies, consumers and manufacturers
thus have more incentives to use and invest in PV cell technologies.
Government bodies, which have large annual spending on purchasing office buildings, vehicles,
and transit infrastructures, can be major customers for new energy technology. Policymakers
should continue to encourage government procurements of energy technologies that private
investors may avoid, helping create early markets and foster confidence in clean energy
technologies, including those that are not yet price competitive.
20
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differentiating the homogenous energy products by distinguishing fossil energy technologies
with environmental-friendly ones on the energy-demand side. These general principles may
serve to guide specific policymaking aimed to accelerate energy technological innovation.
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